JUSTICE GORSUCH’S CHOICE:
FROM BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY TO
DOBBS V. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION
Marc Spindelman *
The Supreme Court’s decision to take up Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization—the Mississippi case involving a law banning
abortions after 15 weeks—likely foreshadows ominous news for
reproductive rights. 1 The most probable reason for the Court to consider
the constitutionality of this measure is to approve it and, in doing so, to
cut back on or overturn Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and what it
preserved of Roe v. Wade. 2 Supporters of reproductive rights are thus as
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right to worry about Dobbs as supporters of the right to life are to feel
hopeful about it. As everyone awaits developments in the case, a
possibility—capable of reconfiguring the entire landscape—dwells in an
unlikely place: last year’s blockbuster LGBT Title VII sex discrimination
ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County. 3
Preserving Casey and Roe in Dobbs will require at least two of the
Court’s conservative justices to join the Court’s three remaining liberals.
Chief Justice John Roberts did that last year in June Medical Services,
L.L.C. v. Russo, the Court’s last major abortion rights case. 4 The Chief
Justice’s swing-vote concurrence in June Medical embraced the Court’s
Casey ruling, with its reaffirmation of Roe’s “essential holding,”
including the rule that the abortion decision is finally the pregnant
woman’s to make prior to fetal viability, around 24 weeks. 5 Everyone on
the level agrees Mississippi’s 15-week abortion ban flouts Casey and its
understanding of Roe’s rules. 6

Court’s decision to take what is unquestionably the biggest abortion case in decades is being greeted
as an existential threat to Roe v. Wade[.] . . . But even if Roe isn’t entirely overturned, the justices
could still hand a huge victory to the antiabortion movement by targeting the linchpin of abortion
rights jurisprudence: the viability standard.”). For additional commentary astutely engaging the larger,
current moment for abortion rights, see David J. Garrow, The Right to Abortion and the Bush-Trump
Federal Courts, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 1, 2021), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-right-toabortion-and-bush-trump.html. For some historical perspective on the current situation, offered with
Dobbs in view, see generally Earl M. Maltz, We Have Been Here Before: Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and the Survival of Abortion Rights, SSRN.COM,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3850724.
3. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
4. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing Roe’s “essential holding”). An account of Chief Justice
John Roberts’ June Medical concurrence as embracing Casey is in Marc Spindelman, Embracing
Casey: June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo and the Constitutionality of Reason-Based Abortion
Bans, 109 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 115 (2020). For views along similar lines, see Garrow, supra note 2
(describing Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical as being “of potentially momentous
importance,” and listing first among the reasons why that “he explicitly declares that ‘under principles
of stare decisis’. . . I would adhere to the holding of Casey”), and Laurence H. Tribe, Roberts’s
Approach Could End Up Being More Protective of Abortion Rights–Not Less, WASH. POST (July 1,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/01/robertss-approach-could-end-up2020),
being-more-protective-abortion-rights-not-less/ (“Although some advocates of abortion rights fear
that the chief justice’s approach will open the door to other restrictions on abortion, I believe that
Roberts’s analysis, correctly applied, could end of being more protective of abortion rights, not less.”).
For the viability line being around 24 weeks, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (“The soundness or
unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at . . . 23 to
24 weeks, as it sometimes does today[.]”), and see also Obstetric Care Consensus, 130 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY e187, e188–89, e192 (2017) (24 weeks).
6. Mississippi is quite clear on this in the merit brief it has filed in Dobbs, arguing first and
foremost that Roe should be overturned. Brief for Petitioners at 12–38, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (July 22, 2021) [hereinafter Dobbs Petitioners’ Brief].
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Informed speculation indicates that even if Chief Justice Roberts
joins the Court’s remaining liberals in Dobbs, no other justice will. As
prediction, this may well prove right. While Casey and Roe’s shared fate
may thus already be sealed, Bostock indicates it should not be. The Court’s
decision in the case provides reasons sounding in women’s equal
citizenship and rule of law values for thinking that its author—Justice Neil
Gorsuch—might, as a matter of principle, supply the additional vote
needed to recommit the Court to Casey and Roe. 7
I. BOSTOCK’S VINDICATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Bostock Court confidently
announces that its holding—that anti-gay and anti-trans discrimination are
sex discrimination outlawed by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—
follows from a “straightforward application of legal terms with plain and
settled meanings.” 8 On its surface, this textualist opinion does not address
constitutional abortion protections, nor, indeed, constitutional rights of
any sort. 9 Yet even as it explains that the “plain” terms of Title VII’s sex
discrimination ban “necessarily” entail a bar against anti-gay and antitrans discrimination, the new reality that Bostock delivers to LGBT
workers is built atop a powerful foundation of women’s workplace
equality under law. 10
Amidst and beyond its textualist positions, Bostock repeatedly
confirms its interpretive work against Title VII sex discrimination rulings
that ground women’s workplace rights and structure Title VII’s sex

7. Some believe that Justice Brett Kavanaugh is as—or more—likely than Justice Gorsuch to
provide this fifth vote to affirm Casey and Roe, particularly given his dissent in June Medical Services
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), the most moderate of the conservative justices’ dissents
delivered in the case. Thinking along these lines is in keeping with the idea that Justice Kavanaugh
has “replaced Roberts as the ideological midpoint of the court.” Nina Totenberg & Eric Singerman,
The Supreme Court’s Term Appeared to Be Cautious. The Numbers Tell a Different Story, NPR.ORG
(July 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/09/1013951873/the-supreme-courts-term-appeared-tobe-cautious-the-numbers-tell-a-different-sto?s=03. Where Justice Amy Coney Barrett is expected to
come out in Dobbs is not based on any position she has expressed in a high profile abortion rights
case at the Supreme Court.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
9. For a close scrub of Bostock that traces its underlying constitutional energies and its rule
of law extensions, and that deals with its broad, but not categorical, elision of the Supreme Court’s
pro-LGBT constitutional rights decisions, see generally Marc Spindelman, Bostock’s Paradox:
Textualism, Legal Justice, and the Constitution, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 553 (2021).
10. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (“plain”), id. at 1742 (“necessarily”), id. at 1744 (same), id. at
1745 (same), id. at 1747 (same). For Bostock’s main textualist account of itself, see id. at 1738–43.
For some of the Court’s discussion of aspects of the foundations of women’s workplace equality under
the statute, see id. at 1743–44. Other passages are noted infra note 11.
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discrimination guarantees. 11 In reaching its pro-LGBT conclusions,
Bostock decisively rejects defense arguments that, in theory, were
inconsistent with, and thus threatened, established sex discrimination
protections, notably rules against sexual harassment and motherhood
discrimination. 12 Reaffirming these anti-discrimination protections,
Bostock continues Title VII’s tradition of safeguarding cisheterosexual
women’s opportunities to work and earn a living on terms cisheterosexual
men have long enjoyed. In the process, all of these individuals are made
more nearly equal at work—and in the remainder of social life. 13 These
sex equality positions point the way from Bostock to a pro-choice ruling
in Dobbs.
II. BOSTOCK’S ALIGNMENT WITH ABORTION RIGHTS
Without discussing abortion rights, Bostock aligns with important
ideas about them offered by the controlling opinion in Casey. Coauthored

11. See, e.g., id. at 1738–39 (“[W]e orient ourselves to the time of the statute’s adoption, here
1964, and begin by examining the key statutory terms in turn before assessing their impact on the
cases at hand and then confirming our work against this Court’s precedents.”); id. at 1743 (“If more
support . . . were required, there’s no need to look far. All that the statute’s plain terms suggest, this
Court’s cases have already confirmed.”). Even within Bostock’s assessment of the statute’s “plain”
meaning, precedent is part of the Court’s analysis. See id. at 1739–41. Passages in which Bostock
looks to the Court’s established sex discrimination rules include id. at 1741 (citing Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion)); id. at 1743–48 (discussing case law
including Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), Los Angeles Dep’t of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998)); id. at 1746 (discussing Phillips); id. at 1746–47 (discussing sexual harassment
and motherhood discrimination); id. at 1748 (discussing legality of “gender role[]” stereotyping); id.
at 1749 (citing Oncale); id. at 1751–52 (same); id. at 1752 (discussing Phillips and sexual harassment
law developments “by the late 1970s”).
12. See, e.g., id. at 1746–47 (discussing the implications of anti-LGBT arguments mounted in
the case for the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination precedents and
rhetorically asking, then answering: “Would the employers have us reverse those cases on the theory
that Congress could have spoken to those problems more specifically? Of course not.”). See also
supra note 11 for other textual passages discussing sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination.
13. For some important reflections on the dynamic relationship between the Court’s Title VII
sex discrimination rules and its constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence, see, for example,
Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 765, 766
(2002) (“[T]he development of the constitutional law of sex discrimination was path dependent, but
not, as I see it, principally on constitutional race-discrimination law, [but] instead on the statutory law
of sex discrimination arising out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It is thus path dependent
on exactly what . . . American law traditionally holds back from, to wit governmental intervention
into private discrimination[.]”), and Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36–37
(1995) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s approach in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989), as coordinated to the Court’s sex stereotyping doctrine found “throughout its modern
constitutional and statutory sex discrimination jurisprudence”).
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by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter,
the Casey joint opinion rededicated the Court to Roe’s “essential holding”
in meaningful respects because the abortion right that it recognized helped
to ensure women’s control over their bodies and their destinies. 14 Casey’s
formal ruling on constitutional liberty highlighted liberty’s equality
dimensions, vindicating what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called
women’s “equal citizenship stature,” and what the Casey joint opinion
described as “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation.” 15 Both Bostock and Casey already rest
within this larger legal framework.
If Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock meshes with Casey in these
ways, suggesting a potential shared future in Dobbs, a counter-indication
to that prospect surfaced last year in June Medical. Dissenting there and
voting to uphold the Louisiana anti-abortion law that the Court’s majority
held inconsistent with Casey and Roe, Justice Gorsuch’s June Medical
opinion said some ominous things about constitutional abortion rights—
arguably pointing toward their elimination. 16

14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (discussing Roe’s “essential holding”); id. at 856 (“The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 852 (characterizing “the abortion decision” as
“originat[ing] within the zone of conscience and belief”); id. (“Her suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny of the woman must
be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.”). Incisive engagement with Casey’s sex equality analytics in the context of lesbian and gay
rights as elaborated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), is in Catharine A. MacKinnon, The
Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1081, 1088 (2004).
15. For Justice Ginsburg’s expression, see Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not
seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”). See also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1287–88 (2003) (discussing “equal
citizenship stature for men and women” and tracing the idea, in part, to Justice Byron White’s dissent
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 361 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)). For the relevant language from
Casey, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. Accord id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic
equality of men and women.”). For more on Justice Ginsburg’s thinking about equal citizenship
stature, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s
Constitutional Vision, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799 (2009). For other points in Casey shoring up its
sense of “what Roe has meant for the ability of women to live according to their own goals and
values,” Christina B. Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1980, 1984 (2002), see Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 855–56, 860–68, 887–98.
16. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2171, 2181–82 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (offering an aerial
vision and snapshot of the trajectory of the opinion’s argument against the results reached by the
Court in the case). For passages in the opinion that arguably run against the grain of existing
constitutional protections for the abortion right, see id. at 2171–79.
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Still, the dissent did not slam the door shut on abortion rights. It
might easily have done so, either in its own terms or by indicating its
agreement with the calls in Justice Clarence Thomas’s June Medical
dissent for Roe to be overturned. 17 By contrast, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
stressed early on that Roe was “not even at issue here,” and later critiqued
the Chief Justice’s June Medical concurrence for its “discontinuity with
Casey,” digging into rules from Casey that Justice Gorsuch believed
should have been followed but were not. 18
Justice Gorsuch’s June Medical dissent ended with a lament that the
Court had “lost [its] way.” 19 Not strictly a comment on Casey and Roe,
the opinion intimated that the Court could—and should—rediscover its
path by a ruling in a future case reestablishing faith with “the neutral
principles that normally govern the judicial process,” presumably
including strict adherence to Casey’s longstanding rules and what they
kept of Roe. 20 In these ways at least, the dissent held space for a more
thoroughgoing embrace of Casey and Roe in a case like Dobbs.
To occupy this space may be thought to require Justice Gorsuch to
soften, if not modify, his position on constitutional abortion rights. 21
Bostock shows the openness of his judicial process, but in ways that
Dobbs may test.
During oral arguments in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.
v. EEOC, one of the cases that Bostock collects and that centered on
whether anti-trans discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII,
Justice Gorsuch voiced concerns about whether interpreting Title VII in
pro-trans ways would yield a “drastic . . . change” or a “massive social
upheaval.” 22 Justice Gorsuch’s expression of these concerns seemed to
17. Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our abortion precedents are grievously wrong and
should be overruled.”); see also id. at 2149–53 (elaborating the argument for the conclusion that “[t]he
Constitution does not constrain the State’s ability to regulate or even prohibit abortion. . . . [T]he
putative right to abortion is a creation that should be undone”). Thanks to Mary Ziegler for
conversation on this aspect of June Medical and on the larger point.
18. June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2171, 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2182 (“lost our way”). The larger discussion is in id. at 2181–82.
20. Id. at 2182. Of course, if “the neutral principles that normally govern the judicial process”
are the touchstone for judgment in Dobbs, it is difficult to see how they would be furthered, much
less honored, by a decision attacking the viability standard that has been in place since Roe governing
the Supreme Court’s constitutional review of abortion regulations. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–
65 (explaining the significance of the viability line).
21. Cf. Tribe, supra note 5 (noting that June Medical was the Chief Justice’s “first vote against
an abortion restriction,” and discussing the significance of the opinion and its prospects).
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, 26, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v.
EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2019/18-107_4gcj.pdf (statements of Justice Gorsuch). For the larger
exchange, see id. at 23–28.
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confirm already-circulating assumptions about his opposition to LGBT
rights. On hearing them, many felt even more confident that he would
reject the pro-trans position in the case, and maybe the pro-gay positions
in the other cases argued the same day. 23
When David Cole, the American Civil Liberties Union attorney
representing Aimee Stephens, the trans plaintiff in Harris Funeral Homes,
met Justice Gorsuch’s concerns head-on, he reminded him that, although
lower courts had recognized trans sex discrimination rights for decades,
those decisions had precipitated no drastic change or massive social
upheaval. 24 The lack of any such response suggested that judicial and
social experiences with trans sex equality under Title VII law posed no
obstacle to what was otherwise a principled, pro-trans outcome in the
case, based on the standard textualist interpretive protocols that were the
main focus of Cole’s advocacy on Stephens’s behalf. 25
Judging from the Bostock opinion, Cole’s reassurances worked.
Without dwelling in thoughts of social disruption, Bostock proudly
presents itself as a “simple and momentous” ruling for LGBT workers and
their rights. 26 Happily, too, as Cole predicted, Bostock has caused no
social uproar. The flurry of anti-trans legislative activity in its wake is
depressing, but a wholly predictable effort in retrenchment seeking to
circumscribe Bostock’s ripple effects. 27 Like other post-Bostock LGBT
rights developments, these measures have already started being processed
by a judiciary that has heard—and is generally following—Bostock’s
trumpet for LGBT equality under law. 28
23. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38 (discussing the cases involving Gerald Bostock and
Donald Zarda).
24. Harris Funeral Homes Transcript, supra note 22, at 27 (statement of David D. Cole)
(“[F]ederal courts of appeals have been recognizing that discrimination against transgender people is
sex discrimination for 20 years. There’s been no upheaval.”).
25. Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens at 3–4, 15–16, 20–27, 36–40, R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107) (noting the arguments from
statutory text favoring Stephens’s position).
26. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“The statute’s message for our cases is . . . simple and
momentous.”). What thoughts of disruption there are in Bostock, particularly legal disruption, cut
against defense positions in the case. For some examples, see id. at 1747 (discussing implications of
defense arguments for sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination rules), id. at 1751
(describing defense arguments as “pro[ving] too much,” because, if accepted, “we’d have more than
a little law to overturn”); id. at 1753 (discussing defense concerns about the “sweep” of the majority
opinion)
27. For one report on the recent flurry of anti-trans legislative activity, see David Crary, No
Big Backlash for States Passing Anti-Transgender Laws, APNEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/us-news-health-laws-legislature-bills-5726fdeb8a5e7cf2c89
a4a2d176e8a7f
28. For some of the pro-LGBT legal actions and decisions in Bostock’s wake, see
Spindelman, supra note 9, at 609 n.180, 610–11 n.182, and Robert Barnes & Hannah Natanson,
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While Justice Gorsuch’s concerns about the social impacts of a protrans ruling in Harris Funeral Homes were resolved by the time Bostock
came out, his decision to express them as part of his deliberative process
was important and telling. The remarks show Justice Gorsuch’s judicial
mindset in action, and how salient to it rule of law ideas about social
stability are—ideas that are among the rule of law values avowed
textualists like Justice Gorsuch have relied on to justify their interpretive
methodology and its results. 29 Overshadowed by Bostock’s textualist
formalism, Justice Gorsuch’s questions in Harris Funeral Homes
indicated a recognition, itself grounded in the rule of law, that judging and
the judicial process, particularly in momentous cases that may operate in
unpredictable and socially disruptive ways, are complex and dynamic, not
mechanical, affairs. 30 Nowhere may artfulness in judicial decisionmaking be more necessary than in cases involving the already superheated waters of culture war politics that have so long and forcefully
swirled around women’s and LGBT rights. 31
Supreme Court Will Not Hear Transgender Bathroom Rights Dispute, a Win for Va. Student Who
Sued His School for Discrimination, WASH. POST (June 28, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-transgender-bathroom-gavingrimm/2021/06/28/e51b47e6-d815-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html. For a recent decision on
new anti-trans legislation that builds on Bostock, see, for example B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2021 WL 3081883, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. July 21, 2021) (citing Bostock
and Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. School Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020), in granting a preliminary
injunction to a transgender athlete against the state’s “Save Women’s Sports Bill”). See also Brandt
v. Rutledge, No. 4:21-CV-00450, 2021 WL 3292057 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 2, 2021) (granting
preliminary injunction against a law banning gender-affirming treatment for transgender minors).
29. See, e.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 47, 55–56 (2019)
(“[W]hen judges pull from the same toolbox and look to the same materials to answer the same narrow
question—What might a reasonable person have thought the law was at the time?—we confine the
range of possible outcomes and provide a remarkably stable and predictable set of rules people are
able to follow. And even when a hard case does arise, once it’s decided it takes on the force of
precedent, becomes and easy case in the future, and contributes further to the determinacy of our
law.”); id. at 57 (“Lawyers seek to make judgments about the future based on a set of reasonably
stable existing rules; they do so with a respect for and in light of the law as it is. This is not politics;
that is the ancient and honorable practice of law.”). For more on Bostock as a rule of law decision
grounded in principles of legal equality or legal justice, see generally Spindelman, supra note 9.
30. GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 189, 195 (“Of course, there are some truly hard cases, plenty
of them. And judging is more of an art than some mechanical science always yielding a single
obviously right answer.”).
31. Commentary from across the viewpoint spectrum debunks the impulse to think that Roe v.
Wade precipitated the “culture wars” around abortion rights, and that, consequently, a decision
overturning Casey and Roe would settle them back down. Sources in this vein include GENE BURNS,
THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL PLURALISMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 150– 206 (2005); BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING ix–x, 1–116, 253, 256–59 (Linda Greenhouse &
Reva Siegel eds., 2010); DAN WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 1–197 (2015); MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE
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Rule of law ideas and ideals about social stability may not figure
prominently and in so many words in Bostock’s official rationale, but their
place in the record forges its own link to Casey and its conviction that rule
of law stability fears were urgent enough in the abortion setting to help
drive it to reconfirm Roe’s basics. 32 Casey honored the foundation of
constitutional abortion rights not only because of the meaning of equalityinflected liberty under the Constitution, but also because of the farreaching social upheaval it understood overturning Roe would produce
across multiple axes of law and social life. 33 When stability returns as a
decisional yardstick in Dobbs, Bostock suggests that Justice Gorsuch will
seriously consider it. It is among the reasons Bostock tees up for him to
claim the space that his June Medical opinion left open for a decision
reaffirming Casey and Roe.
III. CASEY’S TEACHINGS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND
JUDICIAL MODERATION
Whether these prospects will actually materialize in Dobbs depends
partly on whether Justice Gorsuch follows Bostock’s pro-women’s-equalcitizenship and rule of law thinking in the new case. No less significantly,
their materialization will depend on whether the various resonances
between Bostock and Casey impel Justice Gorsuch to engage in a more
searching reflection on the Casey joint opinion’s teachings—teachings he

ABORTION DEBATE 186–218 (2015); MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V.
WADE TO THE PRESENT 6, 13–20, 208–10 (2020). I thank Mary Ziegler for introducing me to some
of these materials. On the deeper connections between cis women’s rights as women’s rights and
LGBT rights, they can be lined up doctrinally, as through the right to privacy or constitutional liberty
guarantees, or along the lines suggested by Bostock as dimensions of larger sex equality concerns.
Perspective on one recent major development, described in Dave Montgomery & Edgar Sandoval,
Near-Complete Ban on Abortion Is Signed Into Law in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/us/texas-abortion-law.html, is found in Laurence H. Tribe &
Stephen I. Vladeck, Texas Tries to Upend the Legal System With Its Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/opinion/texas-abortion-law-reward.html.
32. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (raising the prospect that overturning Roe would produce
“serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the society governed by
it”); id. at 869 (“A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s
legitimacy and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to
the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.”).
33. Discussion of various examples is found in Casey, id. at 846–69, id. at 869–78 (opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.), and id. at 901 (opinion of the Court).

20

CONLAWNOW

[13:11

already knows, but that may reveal new facets as the pressures in Dobbs
put its survival both on the line and in his hands. 34
Casey’s instructions have significant doctrinal dimensions. Casey
acknowledged that, in the years since Roe, it had become an integral part
of the Court’s understanding of constitutional liberty, one that should
persist. 35 Eliminating Roe—as now with Casey itself—was understood as
needlessly and problematically destabilizing to the Court’s larger line of
liberty cases. 36 This series now includes the Court’s pro-LGBT
constitutional rights decisions, which Bostock, without herald, indeed,
without expressly citing them, elevates to new heights.37 Notably for
Justice Gorsuch’s developing jurisprudence, striking at abortion rights in
Dobbs would diminish the wider constitutional context of women’s and
LGBT constitutional liberties, which together reinforce Bostock’s
textualist handiwork.
34. Aside from his opinion in June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), which
discusses Casey, see NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 8–11,
14–15, 18, 39, 77–82, 84, 216, 255 n.10 (2017), which also does.
35. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”);
id. at 847–48 (discussing the Court’s privacy cases and noting that they have “vindicated” “a realm
of personal liberty which the government may not enter”); id. at 849 (discussing the Court’s privacy
cases); id. at 851 (discussing the Court’s privacy cases and quoting the promise from Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972), that the Constitution protects “the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); id. at 852–53 (noting the relationship of Roe
to “the decision to use contraception” protected by decisions whose “correctness” Casey indicates it
does not “doubt”); id. at 869 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“We conclude that the
basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.”); id. at
898 (opinion of the Court) (“If a husband’s interest in the potential life of the child outweighs a wife’s
liberty, the State could require a married woman to notify her husband before she uses a
postfertilization contraceptive.”).
36. For different expressions, see, for example, Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53 (discussing Roe’s
relationship to the Court’s earlier right to privacy cases); 855–57 (discussing various reliance interests
and indicating different doctrinal lines that Roe intersects with). For some additional historical
context, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (No. 88-605) (“[W]e are not asking the Court to unravel the fabric of unenumerated and
privacy rights which this Court has woven in cases like Meyer and Pierce and Moore and Griswold.
Rather, we are asking the Court to pull this one thread.”) (remarks by Charles Fried, Special Assistant
to the Attorney General), but see id. at 26-27 (“It has always been my personal experience that when
I pull a thread, my sleeve falls off. There is no stopping. . . . It is the full range of procreational rights
and choices. . . .”) (remarks by Frank Susman, for the Appellees). The challenges of selectively
pulling the abortion rights thread from the Court’s constitutional privacy, or liberty, decisions is all
the more challenging in the present tense, as noted in the text, because of the Court’s expansion of
those decisions to encompass LGBT rights in the Court’s pro-LGBT constitutional rights
jurisprudence.
37. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The relationship of these cases to Bostock,
including their formal elision in the Court’s opinion, which is not so perfect as at first glance it might
appear, is explored in Spindelman, supra note 9.
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What is more, if Dobbs ends up clawing back abortion rights—no
matter how many times they have been reaffirmed and served as building
blocks for other decisions—it would not only be cases decided in the
Constitution’s open textures of liberty that would be punctuated by a new
question mark. Counterintuitively, an anti-abortion ruling in Dobbs—
establishing the legal conditions for stripping Americans of individual
rights that have persisted for generations—could become the very
precedent that another Court might someday use to stop or roll back
conservative constitutional rights that are now being recognized by the
Court. 38 Such is the double-edged nature of constitutional principle.
Doctrine aside, Casey’s approach to judicial decision-making is an
example of the once-esteemed art and practice of judicial moderation. The
Casey joint opinion presented itself as an attempt to respect the balance
of opposing interests in the case in a way that reflected the hope that, if
done well, the balance might hold going forward, because it would foster
and reinforce a wider spirit of practical accommodation and compromise
in abortion politics. 39 By recalibrating the abortion right through notinsignificant enhancements of its limits—limits that afforded right-to-life
views and values greater room to hold sway over the abortion decision
within the constitutional framework that it announced—the Casey joint

38. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 141
S. Ct. 1294 (2021). For other rights that might be at stake, see also, for example, New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Corlett, 2021 WL 1602643 (Apr. 26, 2021). See also Brendan Pierson,
How COVID and Shadow Docket Exploded SCOTUS’s Scope of Religious Freedom, REUTERS.COM
(June 17, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/how-covid-shadow-docket-explodedscotus-scope-religious-freedom-2021-06-16/.
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866–67 (“Where . . . the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve
the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe . . ., its decision has a dimension that the
resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”). See also Yale
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide – Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 768
(1995) (explaining, in the context of an argument rejecting a broad constitutional right to assisted
suicide, that “[a]ll things considered, I believe the Court that reaffirmed Roe in 1992 was bent on
bringing an old constitutional war to an end—not preparing to fight a new one,” and thereby
distinguishing Casey from pro-assisted suicide claims). Cf. also GORSUCH, ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra
note 34, at 80–81 (2006) (“Similarly, it may well be the case that, in time, Casey may come to be
dominantly read as a stare decisis decision—a ruling, in essence, that we must respect the abortion
right out of traditional deference to settled law—rather than creating any new, open-ended right to
‘define one’s concept of existence.’ . . . How far Casey’s ‘reasoned judgment’ analysis might be
extended thus very much remains to be seen.”). Sharp and still timely analysis of Justice Gorsuch’s
views on assisted suicide and euthanasia and how they might play out in the abortion setting is in
Amy Howe, Gorsuch on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide–And Abortion?, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Mar.
16, 2017), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/gorsuch-euthanasia-assisted-suicide-abortion/.
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opinion figured a constitutional consensus position that it believed people
of good faith, with very different abortion commitments, might accept. 40
Now regarded as a failed attempt in turning political enemies into
friends, Casey chose its path while understanding that the alternative—
returning abortion to the political arena on ordinary terms—would almost
certainly fan the flames of already-burning culture war politics. 41 Casey’s
sightline included the prospects that the passionate commitments of antiabortion positions could easily drag the Court back into the constitutional
fray. 42 Among the reasons: abortion might be outlawed without adequate
provision for women’s life and health, in cases of rape or incest, through
pro-life state constitutional amendments that choke off ordinary political
channels for legal reform, or—scarcely unthinkably—because pro-life
forces have long envisioned the Court announcing a pro-life interpretation
of the Constitution that would outlaw efforts to make abortion legal. 43
40. For Casey’s enhancement of the limits of the abortion right, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–
79 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). For the bid to consensus, see, for example, id.
at 867 (opinion of the Court) (noting constitutional interpretations designed to “call[] the contending
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted
in the Constitution”).
41. For a contrary position, see Dobbs Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 6, at 23 (suggesting that
“any real compromise on the hard issue of abortion” will only arrive after Roe and Casey are
overturned); id. at 24 (“The national fever on abortion can break only when this Court returns abortion
policy to the States—where agreement is more common, compromise is often possible, and
disagreement can be resolved at the ballot box.”). Some will undoubtedly find the idea of compromise
being possible only after Roe and Casey are overturned difficult to track in the context of Dobbs,
particularly given Mississippi’s uncompromising position on abortion rights in its merits brief and as
reflected in the state law at issue in the case.
42. For some perspective on some of the likely patterned effects of a decision overturning
Casey, see, for example, Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 47–82 (2018)
(discussing abortion and poverty); Clare Huntington, Book Review, Abortion Talk, 117 MICH. L. REV.
1043, 1052 (2019) (reviewing Carol Sanger, About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in TwentyFirst-Century America (2017)) (same). See also generally Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Book Review, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270 (2018) (reviewing Khiara M.
Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights (2017)). Related, intersecting effects are also powerfully
described in Michele Goodwin, Banning Abortion Doesn’t Protect Women’s Health, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/opinion/roe-abortion-supreme-court.html
(“Black women bear the brunt of reproductive politicking in the United States.”).
43. For one report on an early-term, previability abortion ban that contains no exceptions for
cases of rape or incest, see Jason Breslow & Sarah McCammon, The Governor of Texas Has Signed
a Law That Bans Abortion as Early as Six Weeks, NPR.ORG (May 19, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/05/19/998237349/the-governor-of-texas-has-signed-a-law-that-bansabortion-as-early-as-6-weeks (noting the law “make no exceptions for pregnancies that are the result
of rape or incest”). The pro-life wish for a Supreme Court decision announcing a pro-life
interpretation of the Constitution has recently been discussed in Mary Ziegler, The Abortion Fight
Has Never Been About Just Roe v. Wade, THE ATLANTIC (May 20, 2021), at
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/abortion-fight-roe-v-wade/618930/. For some
relevant thoughts on state law patterning of abortion law should Casey and Roe be overturned,
consider GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 286, 288 (“Justice [Byron] White . . . argued that the Court had
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A sober judicial assessment of the political upheavals potentially
associated with a decision overturning Roe might thus have suggested to
the justices whose views carried the day in Casey that the Court’s
permanent exit from involvement in the constitutional management of
abortion rights was a pipedream, and a pipedream with steep costs for
liberty, equality, and the rule of law. 44 Accepting that reality, which does
not at all overlook how pro-choice, reproductive justice forces would
respond to such developments, perhaps in the direction of pursuing a new
Roe, the steadiest and surest way forward may have seemed—and may
remain—Casey’s path, trying, however imperfectly, to find an idealized
consensus point for the Court to hold fast to when applying the rules Casey
announced.
As between the stark alternatives of staying Roe’s course or
retreating from it entirely, Casey broke toward the middle path of a “Pax
Roeana.” 45 It did so not because its own head was in the clouds, but
because that path was illuminated by a perspective that was itself
informed by conservative, rule of law preferences for legal and social
stability, respect for settled decisions and principled decision-making, and
a sense that Roe’s basics, even if Roe was initially wrongly decided,
conduced to modern-day understandings of women’s liberty and equality
in society and under law, if with limits. 46 In Casey’s estimation, these all
were values befitting the Supreme Court as a rule of law institution to
respect while issuing its constitutional judgment in the case. 47

an obligation to take and resolve these disagreements so that people in one part of the country weren’t
treated differently from those elsewhere only because of the happenstance of geography.”). This
patterning might be reinforced through legal rules regulating interstate travel to procure an abortion.
44. See supra note 32.
45. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
46. Id. at 868 (opinion of the Court) (“The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker
for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not
changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete.”); id. at 865 (framing an explanation
for “why overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under
principles of stare decisis, but would [also] seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law”); id. at
874 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
47. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (opinion of the Court) (“A decision to overrule Roe’s
essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment
to the rule of law.”).

24

CONLAWNOW

[13:11

IV. THE SPIRITUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CASEY’S
SPIRIT OF MODERATION
From one perspective, Casey’s middle path is a conventional libertybased constitutional ruling that respects women’s liberty and advances
women’s equal citizenship stature by broadly freeing abortion from
religious and moral condemnations of it expressed through law. Casey
fosters and reinforces this impression of itself when it comments that:
“Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation
is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” 48 In
saying this, Casey indicates it is not issuing a morality-based, antiabortion ruling in the case. This is true as far as it goes, but it does not tell
the whole story. No sooner does Casey relinquish morality as a touchstone
for an anti-abortion ruling than it embraces a spiritual outlook that
animates the reasoning it offers and the conclusions it reaches, and could
yet again in Dobbs.
Casey’s spiritual outlook is on display—hidden in plain sight—in
one of the joint opinion’s most memorable and infamous expressions.
Casey locates the abortion decision within “the heart of [constitutional]
liberty,” which, it says, is “the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life.”49
Involving these higher matters, abortion, on this view, is spiritually
driven, expressed in liberal terms through decision and choice.
Casey elaborates this idea as it proceeds. Indeed, in its very next
paragraph, Casey explains:
[T]hough the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a
unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family,
and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures
exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against
innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted. Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow
that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because
48. Id. at 850.
49. Id. at 851. For a thoughtful effort that traces the “underground establishment clause” in the
Court’s abortion cases, including Casey, see Justin Murray, Exposing the Underground Establishment
Clause in the Supreme Court’s Abortion Cases, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2010). See also id. at 3–4
n.8 (collecting sources discussing abortion’s relationship to religion and the First Amendment’s
religion clauses).
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the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full
term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human
race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes
of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds
for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society. 50

The bookends here express the crucial features of Casey’s spiritual
perspective on the case’s stakes. “[T]he abortion decision[,] originat[ing]
within the zone of conscience and belief” and impacting “the woman’s
[social] role,” “must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society[.]” 51 The decision
whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term and to become a mother
emerges from, and so involves, spiritual grounds.
Understood in these terms, Casey’s middle way does not simply cut
a path between women’s autonomous decision-making, on the one hand,
and conservative religious and traditional moral views and values, on the
other. That is how Casey ultimately expresses the point as its
constitutional conclusion, but before it does so, Casey’s spiritual framing
indicates the abortion conflict implicates a clash of spiritual positions that,
for purposes of this constitutional decision at least, are on the same
plane. 52
Casey’s exercise of judicial moderation is thus a stylized expression
of a deeper spiritual perspective that refuses to hold any one spiritual

50. Id. at 852. For more along these lines, see id. 850 (“Men and women of good conscience
can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earlierst stages”); id. at 853 (discussing the
“wonder of creation”). See also, e.g., id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“As the joint opinion so eloquently demonstrates, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is
nothing less than a matter of conscience.”); id. at 919 (“A woman who has, in the privacy of her
thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her decision cannot be forced to reconsider
all, simply because the State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.”).
51. Id. at 852.
52. Attuned to this, Casey’s readers may appreciate subtleties of expression that could
otherwise be easily missed, as when the opinion talks about “[m]en and women of good conscience”
disagreeing with one another “about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy, even in its earliest stages.” Id. at 850. Moral and spiritual perspectives in the locution
exhaust the universe of values Casey implicates at its own heart.
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stance on abortion—for or against it—above any other. Casey’s approach
to the conflict in the case is, accordingly, spiritually moderate and modest,
as well as spiritually pluralistic. Paying equal respects to the different
spiritual expressions the case involves, both pro-choice and pro-life
people of “good conscience” receive decisional jurisdiction over part of
women’s pregnancies with fetal viability—inherited from Roe and
preserved for the reasons Casey explains—serving as the crucial
jurisdictional boundary line. 53 Not inviolable, this boundary is porous in
rule-bound respects. Each spiritual perspective has some limited room to
operate where the other generally reigns supreme. 54 Prior to viability,
where the spiritually-based choice whether to have an abortion is
paramount, pro-life views and values may operate by seeking to
persuade—but not coerce or force—a particular abortion decision. 55
Likewise, after viability, where pro-life religious and moral views and
values hold sway, they must still yield where a pregnant woman’s life or
health is at stake. 56 In all of this there is a sense of a rule of law vision of
equal justice that is in operation. According to it, women and men of good
conscience are treated with the law’s equal respect and in roughly the
same way.
Recognizing this, Casey does not rest content with ensuring that
women’s bodies and minds are not wholly overtaken by the state prior to
fetal viability consistent with pro-life views and values—as imperative as
that is in constitutional liberty terms. More fundamentally, Casey’s
promises minister and safeguard women’s spiritual integrity and welfare,
including their consciences and beliefs. Casey’s instruction is that these
dimensions of women’s spiritual being must likewise be preserved intact,
neither shattered nor negated before viability by pro-life anti-abortion
laws that force women to travel a spiritual road not of their own free will. 57

53. See, e.g., id. at 861 (“[N]o changes of fact have rendered viability more or less appropriate
as the point at which the balance of interests tips.”). For relevant discussion of viability in Casey, see
id. at 860–61 (opinion of the Court), id. at 869–79 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
54. See, e.g., id. at 878–79 (summarizing holding).
55. Id. at 877 (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right
to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect
for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise
of the right to choose.”).
56. See, e.g., id. at 879 (opinion of the Court).
57. As the joint opinion puts it immediately after describing “the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”: “Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. For a different perspective on the relation of this freedom to the
viability line, see id. at 870 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“In some broad sense
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Formally for women’s benefit, this understanding reaches out to pro-life
religious conservatives and traditional moralists. It is as if Casey, having
already expressed fellowship, even identity, with them, says: We, of all
people, must understand the importance of the state honoring the dignity
and nobility of spiritual being and the sometimes mysterious movement
of the spirit unto conscientious conviction and belief—even when the
conclusions that another spirit reaches are profoundly at odds with our
own.
Not incidentally, Casey’s spiritual pluralism and the constitutional
rules that it produces supply the elements required for a full reply to the
famous charge that the “dictum” of its sweet-mystery-of-life passage is
“the passage that ate the rule of law.” 58 The accusation’s rhetorical
delights paper over its own substantive excesses. The drama of its
expression distracts from how Casey’s spiritual pluralism actually
manifests in law-bound ways via its cross-cutting jurisdictional carve-ups.
By its own terms, Casey conserves—it does not eat—the rule of law.
In other terms, however, the charges against Casey’s mystery-of-life
passage stick. The ridicule they heap on Casey’s spiritual outlook speaks
to a recognizable outrage on the pro-life right about Casey’s equal legal
treatment project and its ostensibly implied moral equivalence of abortion
and religious and moral opposition to it. In this at least there is a certain
convergence with the pro-choice left. For different reasons, progressive,
pro-choice reactions to Casey’s spiritualizing are primed to see it as
unwarranted statist evangelizing that figures women’s autonomous
reasons and choices as spiritually grounded, whether they are or not. To
make matters worse, this apparent affront to women’s capacities for
rational, autonomous decision-making is not directed at—but rather
past—them. Its overarching function is to offer a rationale that might
persuade faithful conservatives and traditional moralists to accept the
Court’s outcome in the case.
Bostock resonates with some of these themes in its own way,
especially when it trains its sights on existing sex discrimination
protections against sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination.
Bostock’s multiple invocations of these cases and their rules subtly give

it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention
on behalf of the developing child.”).
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Court is referring
not to the holding of Casey, but to the dictum of its famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage . . . : That
‘casts some doubt’ upon either the totality of our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer)
nothing at all. . . . [I]f the passage calls into question the government’s power to regulation actions
based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the passage that ate the rule of law.”).
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off the impression that they are being conceived at least in part from
within a traditionalist perspective that imagines sexuality, reproduction,
parenting, and, distinctively, motherhood, as tied to higher moral purposes
and ends. This understanding, broadly familiar within U.S. cultural
traditions as Casey attests, corresponds with ideas that circulated in the
cases Bostock collects, where the idea of “sex”—both as an attribute and
an activity, sometimes with reproductive consequences—at times carried
discernible religious undertones. 59
Against this backdrop, Bostock’s emphasis on sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination rules reads as an element of a judicial strategy
meant to appeal to culturally conservative audiences by indicating that
values they hold dear—around sexuality and motherhood—are not
imperiled but affirmed by the decision, which otherwise limits the scope
of their religious and moral outlooks. A more prominent dimension of this
strategy arrives in Bostock’s reassurances that its protections for LGBT
workers will not in the future needlessly imperil religious rights. 60
Without exactly pursuing its own path of peace, Bostock seeks to calm the
intensities of the opposing positions in the case in a way that loosely
reflects Casey’s sensibility and that tracks its structure of recognizing
conflicting rights and interests while reaching for modes of doctrinal
accommodation.
Bostock’s express affirmation of its own concerns with First
Amendment free exercise rights and statutory protections against religious
discrimination keep the Court from having to contemplate the prospect of
redefining its sexual harassment and motherhood discrimination
protections in traditionalist terms. That undertaking, which would have
involved re-imagining Title VII’s rules in relation to traditionalist

59. On Casey’s attestation, see supra text accompanying note 50. For some discussion of the
uses of the term “sex” in the cases that Bostock collects, see Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return:
A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part II, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 87,
91–92 n.14 (2020), and Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A Serial Essay on the LGBT Title
VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part III, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 101, 105–06 & n.16 (2020). The
sexual logics of aspects of the anti-trans position in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., v.
EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107), are discussed generally in Spindelman, Shower’s Return,
Part II, in Spindelman, Shower’s Return, Part III, and in Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return: A
Serial Essay on the LGBT Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Part IV, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 117
(2020).
60. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1733, 1753–54 (2020) (recognizing that, while
“the employers fear that complying with Title VII’s requirements in cases like ours may require some
employers to violate their religious convictions[,]” “[w]e are also deeply concerned with preserving
the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution; that guarantee lies at the
heart of our pluralistic society,” and then going on to flag statutory protections for religious liberties
that future cases might implicate).
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purposes, would anyway have conflicted with Bostock’s textualist
commitments. Moreover, it would have contradicted Bostock’s broad
understanding of sex discrimination rights for LGBT persons, newly
afforded the right to be themselves at work.
Recalling that LGBT rights in Bostock emerge from a legal
framework guaranteeing cisheterosexual women anti-discrimination
protections, Bostock’s meaning for their rights to be themselves must not
be overlooked. As Bostock intimates, these rights include women’s
individual control over sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood
decisions. These decisions are only meaningful individual choices when
liberated from the traditionalist ideas that, in “the course of our history
and our culture,” have dominated them. 61 If sexual harassment and
motherhood discrimination rules now broadly carry equality-enhancing
and liberty-affirming meanings, it is significantly because existing
constitutional rules—including the abortion right—make women’s sexual
and reproductive destinies more truly their own. These rationalizing
logics, which link Title VII’s sex discrimination protections to
constitutional sex discrimination rules, hold up across the expanse of Title
VII sex discrimination law in ways Bostock does not spotlight. Title VII’s
sex discrimination rules also ban pregnancy discrimination—a prohibition
that has authoritatively been held to afford women the right to make
pregnancy-related decisions, including abortion, for themselves, without
suffering adverse consequences at work. 62
Much like Bostock, which voices its “deep[] concern[s] with”
religious liberty only to stop short of manifesting their doctrinal
implications in the case, Casey generates its spiritual outlook on the
abortion right and then noticeably pumps the brakes on it. 63 Casey
declines to convert its spiritual outlook on abortion into First Amendment
protections for it, and likewise refuses to rule religious and moral
opposition to abortion out of bounds as a religious establishment problem.
Nor, along similar lines, does Casey require the exercise of the abortion
right to hinge on any spiritual test. 64 Instead, abiding by established
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
62. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (Westlaw through PL 117-26 with the exception of
PL 116-283, Div. A, Title XVIII, which takes effect January 1, 2022); U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2015-1, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES § I.A.4.c, § I.A.4.c n.58 (2015). See also Doe v. C.A.R.S Prot.
Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008).
63. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
64. Casey does, however, recognize that the state has the authority, even prior to viability, to
legislate to ensure that the abortion choice is a thoughtful and meaningfully informed one. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 881–87 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (discussing 24-hour waiting
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traditions of liberal political constitutional discourse, Casey translates its
spiritual outlook on abortion into publicly accessible secular terms that
officially declare abortion to be a protected aspect of constitutional
liberty. 65
Whether all this formally makes Casey’s spiritual pluralism,
including its mystery-of-life language, legally binding as precedent or
merely dictum remains an esoteric constitutional question of real interest
and import. That question, however, need not be settled for Casey
successfully to impart its spiritual teachings to future generations,
including the justices who will soon be deciding abortion’s fate in Dobbs.
V. CONCLUSION: THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
At a unique moment in American history—during “the critical World
War II year of 1944”—Judge Learned Hand delivered a famous address
to a large audience gathered in New York City’s Central Park. 66 Those in
attendance included “a large number of new citizens.” 67 The topic of
Judge Hand’s address was “the spirit of liberty.” 68 In it, he shared aspects
of his own faith in liberty as an ideal, one worthy of the heroic sacrifices
Americans were making, some with their very lives, as part of the national
war effort. 69
As his starting point, Judge Hand invoked a distinctively American
“faith, a faith in a common purpose, a common conviction, a common

period rule as an informed consent measure). If, on one level, this sounds merely like Casey is
allowing the state to ensure that the conditions for autonomous decision-making obtain, it also, on
another level, may be seen as holding space for meaningfully deliberative spiritual reflection and
choice-making that comes from it. For some related discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153
(1994).
65. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 845–46, 851–53, 857–58. On public justification, see
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 CHI. L. REV. 765, 765–66 (1997) (describing
public reason as “part of the idea of democracy itself” and explaining that “[c]itizens realize that they
cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable
comprehensive doctrines” and so “they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably
give to one another when fundamental political questions are at stake,” and then proposing “that in
public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens”). Casey’s translation of pro-life religious and moral
positions into state interests is a similar expression of the point, if one that may be less thoroughgoing.
66. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 189 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952) [hereinafter HAND PAPERS]. An
account of the circumstances of the address and its aftermath is in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 469–73 (2011).
67. Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 189.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 191.
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devotion.” 70 The practice of this faith did not involve liberty in its
conventional terms, such as liberty as an “unbridled will” or the “freedom
to do what one likes.” 71 Rather, the liberty he put his stock in was an
advanced, a mature, or what sounds like a judicial vision of liberty: liberty
as empowered but still humble, self-restrained, moderate, and full of a
sense of fellow-feeling and mutual respect in ways that might position
Americans to realize common ends.72 Vital to the realization of this spirit
of liberty was Judge Hand’s call to his audience—and the American
people in a wider sense—to hold this spirit of liberty in their hearts and to
manifest it through an active interest in understanding “the minds of other
men and women” and to “weigh[] their interests alongside [their own]
without bias.” 73
Expressed in terms of civic virtues, Judge Hand’s spirit of liberty
refracted the judicial virtues famously part of his own judicial practice. 74
Clear-eyed, he appreciated the significance of the American people
accepting—and choosing to live—the spirit of liberty as their creed.
Where they chose not to, no court could force them. As he put it in another
address from the same year, making a point that is sadly relevant today,
given the deep, intense divides of American politics: “[A] society so riven
that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save.” 75 However
accurate as prediction, there was Judge Hand, professing his public faith
in the spirit of liberty—a faith that, for him, had religious bearings—while
trying to give that spirit flight and a home in American hearts.76
While the Supreme Court lacks the power to compel the American
people’s embrace of the spirit of liberty as an article of civic faith, the
Court, like Judge Hand did, nevertheless has its own virtues and practices
to attend to when issuing its decisions. Through its “constant tending” of
the nation’s laws, the Court must choose in those cases, like abortion, that

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id.
For some expression, see generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958 (1958).
75. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1944), in
HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 172, 181. Hand makes much the same point in different terms in his
“The Spirit of Liberty” speech. See Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note
66, at 190 (“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law,
no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. . . .”).
76. For Judge Hand’s text’s suggestion of its religious underpinnings, see Hand, The Spirit of
Liberty, in HAND PAPERS, supra note 66, at 190. Gerald Gunther’s biography of Judge Hand observes
that while the address had “notable religious overtones, including an invocation of Jesus Christ,”
Judge Hand was “for decades an agnostic[.]” GUNTHER, supra note 66, at 473.
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implicate it, whether to exercise its authority so as to shore up or weaken
the American people’s faith in the common endeavor of a republic of
which we are all equal parts. 77
What will happen to this faith in Dobbs? Casey’s failure to forge an
enduring peace among the contending sides in the ongoing battles over
abortion is one thing. Perhaps Justice Gorsuch, because of how he may
see and understand the different sides in Dobbs, will be positioned to offer
a better account for good-faith acceptance of Casey’s longstanding rules
than Casey itself did. In doing so, he might explain to the American people
why accepting Casey, with its acceptance of Roe’s basics, still serves the
common good of the republic that people want to keep—even if one
believes Roe was wrongly decided at the outset.
Whether he ventures this effort, consistent with the type of ruling his
Bostock decision recommends, and with what effects on women’s equal
citizenship stature and for the rule of law, is now Justice Gorsuch’s choice
to make.

77. GORSUCH, supra note 29, at 17, 21 (“Our blessings cannot be taken for granted and need
constant tending.”). One aspect of Casey’s reflection of the point is in Casey, 505 U.S. at 868:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time.
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the
rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases
and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy should
be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its
constitutional ideals. The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court,
but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.

